19 MAR 1979

•	į	.:
24 21/6	 I	-
71-0167	, 	~

MEMORANDUM	FOR:	Deputy	Director	for	Administration

FROM :

Director of Communications

SUBJECT : Background Paper - National Communications

Directive

25)

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is for your information only. Its purpose is to inform you of the background and current status of the National Communications Security Directive and of a potentially controversial issue associated with the directive.

25)

2. Background:

- a. From August 1968 to November 1977, national communications security policies were established and issued by the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) with a membership similar, but not identical to the Intelligence Community. The DCI's principal representative on the Board was the Director of Communications.
- b. In November 1977, the USCSB was disestablished by Presidential Directive/NSC-24 (Attachment 1) which also realigned the national management and policy review responsibilities for communications security as shown in Attachment 2.
- c. In May 1978, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (ASDC³I), acting for the Executive Agent, circulated to the former USCSB members a draft Executive Agent COMSEC Directive which established organizational relationships and delegated functions within the government for the discharge of the responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for COMSEC.
- d. A principal feature of the draft directive was the establishment of a National Security Communications Protection Committee (NSCPC) with a membership and mission very similar to the former USCSB. The singular difference was that the NSCPC only recommended policy to the Executive Agent for COMSEC, whereas the former USCSB established policy.

25X1

SUBJECT: Background Paper - National Communications
Directive

- e. In its critique of the draft (Attachment 3), and in subsequent meetings on the subject, CIA contended that national policy should be established by the committee based on a vote of the full membership. The Departments of State, Treasury, and Navy shared that position. That change and others were incorporated into the draft and a final draft (Attachment 4) was submitted to the DoD General Counsel some time around September 1978.
- In the course of staffing out the final language of the draft directive, we provided the DCI with two information memoranda. His note on the memorandum of 3 August (Attachment 5) indicates that the DCI had reservation about our position on the issue of establishing policy versus recommending policy. No response was made to the DCI's note because none was called for and because we felt that the issue could be resolved to our satisfaction at the staff level without DCI intercession. On the 7 August memorandum (Attachment 6) the DCI indicated that he agreed with the ASDC³I statement that PD-24 clearly indicated that the Executive Agent would establish policy. Although we find no language in PD-24 which specifically supports the ASDC³I statement, we acknowledge that PD-24 imposes no restrictions on how the Executive Agent should carry out his responsibilities - he is left free to establish policies and procedures as he sees fit. We do not challenge the Executive Agent's authority to limit the committee to an advisory role, we only argue the view that national COMSEC policy interests are better served by a policy making committee.
- g. Our premise is that sound national COMSEC policy must be a balanced reflection of civilian and DoD interests. That precept is not viable if the Secretary of Defense in his Executive Agent capacity has absolute power over the committee.

25X

25X1	SUBJECT: Background Paper - National Communications Directive	
25X1	administer a national asset which supports national objectives at locations around the world. Customers include civilian and military elements of the government, and we feel strongly that the managers and civilian users of such a system should have a strong voice in the formulation of the national COMSEC policies to which they will be bound.	2
25X1	h. Recently we were informed that as a result of the DoD General Counsel review, the draft directive will be changed to recast the committee in its original role as an advisory body. Ultimately, the new draft will be submitted to the community for final comment. We will keep you advised of the issues involved and positions taken.	2
	Attachments: 1 - Presidential Directive/NSC-24 2 - Chart of Proposed COMSEC Community Structure 3 - CIA Critique of National Security Communications Protection Committee Draft Directive 4 - Final Draft of National COMSEC Directive 5 - Information Memo to DCI 6 - Information Memo to DCI	٠

UNCLASSIFIED	USE	UNLY			HA-RDP83-00156R000200030133-0 SECRET
		OUTIN	G AND	RECOR	RD SH DDA79-0969
SUBJECT: (Optional)				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	kground Pa	per - N	Mational	Communi	ications Directive
FROM: ADDA			,	EXTENSION	NO. THE POSTS TO
ADDA					DATE FILE
IO: (Officer decision)					27 March Communication
TO: (Officer designation, room building)	number, and	D	ATE	OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
1.		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	INITIALS	to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
		27	IAR 1979	Sa V	Don, 25)
DDA	<i>A</i>		7073	<u>w</u>	1. I can readily understand concern but I don't
			de es		think his position is a very strong
- low	138		13 (13)		one. Naturally we would prefer to
3. 1CE 1		Temporales realts			be a full voting member of the policy formulation apparatus. In
25X1		5 No. 1			that way we can be certain that CIA
4.		in the	1000		views will be heard. However, I find it difficult to believe that
They					the Secretary of Defense in the
5.				-	Executive Agent role would dis-
17/-					regard a recommendation coming to
· ////]			him from the Security Committee (NCSC) which would include the same
	7.		L		CIA views. It should also be noted
. AV	4 •	_7	5)		that the Secretary of Defense is already the Executive Agent for the
		V			National Communications System and
		7	>		the Executive Agent for National
an Ma		_4			cryptologic matters. I believe he has fulfilled these roles
					objectively and has not leaned
	Cuis	8			excessively in the direction of Dol
A 13		7		į	interests. I think he would carry out this additional Executive Agent
		MI			role with similar objectivity. If
	AP P		5		not, we can always appeal his police decisions through the DCI. I don't
	M3. 1				think this will happen very often.
		<u> </u>			2. In summary, I recommend
	TH	-			that CIA continue to support its previous position in commenting on
					future drafts of the directive, but
			·		I would not recommend that we go to
		1863			the mat if it is published in its current version - which OC objects
	4110			•	to. I believe we can live with it.
	12	ma . S	U		without too much trouble.
DDADistribution		14			25X
Orig RS - D/CO w	Orig // A 7 0969w/	ontto	1		
1-DDA Subj	w/cy of at	ts	, ()	and	MAR 1979 lifford D. May, Jr.
610 use produsCaro	SECRET		DUCTOCAL		INTERNAL
			ONFTDENT		USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED CIA-RDP83-00156R000200030133-6

79-0969

	·					CONSIDENTIAL (XX SECR) 00200030133-6 RD SHEET	
SUBJECT:	(Optional)						
	Backgroun	d Paper -	Nati	onal Co		cations Directive	25
FROM:					EXTENSION	NO. BC-M79-166	
	D/CO			, i s	<u> </u>	DATE 1 9 MAR 197 9	25
TO: (Offi	cer designation, room	number and	,/ D/	ATE .	055100010		Park State Of State
building)	4/204	3/20	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S		mom lent.)
	DDA √7D18 Hqs.		2.3	MAR 1979	Du		
-	DONNY					Laprenste	
3.	0/DD	的一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个				Appresti you new	
4						W/Ki	
5.						La Hin Justins Coores	
6.					*375		
7.					- -		
8.						23 MAR 197	9
9.				e de la companya de l			
0.							
11.							
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.						7	- 1